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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is appellant's notice of appeal premature when it is

filed after the entry of the judgment and after appellant's
post-judgment motions have been filed, but prior to a ruling on
the post-judgment motions?

After the lower court has ruled on

the post-judgment motions, must a new notice of appeal be filed
within 30 days thereafter?

If such a new notice of appeal was

not filed, should the appeal be dismissed?
2.

Appellant challenges an "Order And Judgment" filed

October 15, 1982 that was a final order on the alter ego issue.
May an appellant seeks review of that final order or judgment
more than two years after it was made?

Or should the appellant

have filed a notice of his intention to appeal as provided by
Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that were then in
effect?
3.

If the appeal on the alter ego issue is considered on

its merits, was the ruling of the lower court correct when it
found that Dixie Power And Water, Inc. was the alter ego of
Darrell G. Hafen?

In the usual case, the alter ego doctrine, or

piercing the corporate veil, is applied to reach the personal
assets of the person using the corporation improperly.

But may

piercing the corporate veil be applied "backwards", that is, to
reach assets placed in a corporation to collect a personal debt,
if the corporation is one where practically none of the corporate
formalities have been observed and the corporation is dominated
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and controlled by one individual who incurred the debt in his
individual capacity?
4#

Did all the defendants make a general appearance in

court on the first writ of attachment?

Did such general

appearance make actual personal service of process or notice of
hearing on the writ unnecessary?

Did the court therefore err in

dissolving the first writ of attachment?

Even if the first writ

was properly dissolved, wasn't there a second writ properly
issued, served, and hearing had thereon?

Or did the court err in

granting the writ of attachment?
5.

May an attorney's lien be impressed on property that

does not belong to the attorney's client?

Was the attorney's

lien filed before the court had ruled that the attached funds
were not the client's assets, but the assets of Darrell G. Hafen?
If so, and even if the attorney's lien is valid, were there any
funds to attach?

Had Dixie's attorney filed an answer containing

a counterclaim at any time prior to filing his alleged lien?

Was

there a verdict, report, decision, or judgment in his client's
favor?

Transamerica contends 'yes' answers to these questions

are essential before a valid attorney's lien is created,
6.

Was summary judgment proper?

Has appellant presented on

appeal any genuine issue on any material fact?
76-3-201.2(2) of the Utah Code apply?

Does Section

If so, isn't it conclusive

on the issues of liability and amount of damages?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASg
Appellant Dixie Power And Water, Inc. appeals from an
"Order Granting Summary Judgment" to the plaintiffs following a
hearing on November 21, 1984.

Appellant also seeks review of an

"Order And Judgment" filed October 15, 1982 which held that
appellant was the alter ego of the individual defendant Darrell
G. Hafen and that appellant's assets were in fact the assets of
Hafen.

Appellant also challenges the issuance of a writ of

attachment and asserts that his attorney has a valid attorney's
lien on the attached funds.

Respondent seeks to uphold the

rulings of the lower court and seeks dismissal of the appeal for
failure to comply with the rules governing appeals to the Supreme
Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Transamerica Cash Reserve (Transamerica) is a money
market mutual fund that sells shares to the public, invests those
proceeds in short-term investments, and passes the income on to
its investors or shareholders (T 18). First National Bank of
Boston is the transfer agent for Transamerica (T 20).
On September 21, 1981, defendant Darrell G. Hafen
(Hafen) opened an account with Transamerica (T 22), and between
that date and December 31, 1981, Hafen made 22 deposits (share
purchases) totaling $1,465,000.00.
$12,000.00 were good.

Of these deposits, only

Meanwhile, Hafen made 20 redemptions, or

checks, and obtained $406,380.75 in cash, leaving Transamerica
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with a net loss of $394,380.75.

Transamerica was able to recover

all but $93,426.59 of this loss through banking channels. (T
39-41, 47; Exhibit P-l). All of the -deposits were admitted into
evidence (Exhibit P-3), as were all of the check redemptions
(Exhibit P-4) .

Summary judgment for $93,426.59 was granted at a

hearing on November 21, 1984 (R 506) and the judgment was filed
December 3, 1984 (R 507-509).
Hafen was prosecuted and convicted of mail fraud in the
United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, in
Criminal No. 82 00053, on the same deposits that pertain to this
action (R 476-503).
Transamerica commenced this civil action on February 5,
1982, filing a verified complaint (R 1-27), a motion for a
prejudgment writ of attachment (R 30), the required undertaking
(R 28-29) , and obtained a writ of attachment that was served on
First Security Bank (R 32-35) where funds were on deposit under
the name of Dixie Power And Water, Inc. (Dixie) , a corporation
alleged in the complaint to be the alter ego of Hafen.

The funds

were placed in an interest bearing account (R 39) by the clerk of
the court.
The hearing on the prejudgment writ of attachment came
on for hearing February 11, 1982, but was continued at Hafen's
request until March 9, 1982 (R 37-38).

On March 9, 1982,

Defendants appeared by counsel, Fay E. Reber, and moved for a
continuance to April 13, 1982.

Transamerica stipulated to said

continuance, and the court entered its "Order Continuing Hearing"
on March 11, 1982, and continued the writ (R 50-51).

Q

On April

13, 1982, the day set for hearing, attorney Scott A. Gubler
appeared for Dixie and filed documents objecting to the writ.
The hearing was again continued to May 10th by agreement (R 64,
84-85).

On May 10, 1982, the court heard the testimony of John

Hafen, the son of Darrell G. Hafen (D 3:16-20), who had given his
deposition in this matter on May 7, 1982.

At the May 10th

hearing, the court found that Darrell G. Hafen failed to appear
for his deposition scheduled for May 7, 1982, and ordered him to
appear for the taking of his deposition on May 21, 1982, and
continued the writ (R 69-71).
On May 20, 1982, Attorney Scott A. Gubler filed his
affidavit in which he states that Hafen had resigned as President
of Dixie on or about May 14, 1982, because his refusal to attend
the deposition could bring sanctions against Dixie (R 81-82).

On

May 18, 1982, Transaraerica requested the court to rule, based
upon the testimony of John Hafen at the May 10, 1982 hearing,
that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen (R 73-74).

Appellant has

not obtained a transcript of this testimony as part of the record
on appeal.

Transamerica also moved for default judgment on the

grounds that all Defendants had made general appearances by
counsel but had not filed an answer to the complaint (R 75-76).
The matter came on for hearing on June 8, 1982, and the
parties presented their arguments.

The court ruled, based on the

file and the testimony of John Hafen, that Dixie was the alter
ego of Hafen and that the assets of Dixie were the assets of
Hafen.

Without the May 10, 1982 testimony of John Hafen, this

court cannot question the lower court's finding that Dixie was,

9

in factf the alter ego of Hafen and that the purported assets of
Dixie were, in fact, the assets of Hafen.

The court requested

Transamerica1s attorneys to prepare the findings and judgment on
the alter ego issue.
At the same June 8, 1982 hearing, the court also ruled
that the writ should be dissolved because notice was not properly
served on Dixie as required by Rule 64A(7) U.P.C.P. (R 167-168) ,
even though Dixie had actual notice and its counsel had made
several appearances in the matter.
attorney to prepare this order.

The court requested Dixie's

Proposed findings and judgments

were prepared by Dixie (R 155-156, 169-170), and by Transamerica
(R 157, 160-164).

Dixie filed objections to Transamerica1s

documents (R 165-166), and Transamerica filed objections to
Dixie's documents (R 158-159).
Because of the June 8, 1982 ruling dissolving this
first writ of attachment, Transamerica immediately sought, on
June 9, 1982, a second writ of attachment (R 152-154).

The judge

held these documents, along with many others, in the file in his
chambers, which explains why the record shows all these documents
being filed with the clerk on October 15, 1982, when the court
finally made some decisions in this matter.

In the meantime,

personal service of the summons and complaint on all Defendants
was obtained on June 10, 1982 when Darrell G. Hafen was served in
custody at the Terminal Island Correction Facility (R 96-98).

On

July 2, 1982, Hafen filed an answer for all Defendants (R
99-103) , even though Mr. Gubler also claimed to be representing
Dixie.

In this answer, Hafen claimed he was President of both

corporate Defendants, despite Mr. Gubler's affidavit that Hafen
had resigned (R 81-82) as President of Dixie on May 14 f 1982.
On July 14, 1982, the objections to the form of the
findings and judgments or orders were considered, and the court
signed in open court (Tl 4:11-18) the documents that reflected
its rulings of June 8, 1982 on both the alter ego issue (P
171-174) and the dissolution of the first writ of attachment (R
167-170).

The documents the court signed on the alter ego issue

were prepared by Dixie's own attorney because of objections to
those prepared by Transamerica (R 165) . At the hearing,
Transamerica's attorney stated that they would accept those
prepared by Dixie's attorney (Tl 3:3-5). The findings the court
signed on the dissolution of the writ were actually prepared by
Transamerica1s attorney (but not the order), and did have the
frank of Dixie's attorney, but this was later ordered stricken at
the hearing on November 9, 1982 (T2 3:7-14).
As shown in the partial transcript of the July 14, 1982
hearing (Tl 4:8-10, these words were actually spoken by Mr.
Miles, Transamerica's attorney, and not by Mr. Gubler as
reported), Transamerica also requested a second writ of
attachment in open court, and presented the documents to the
court (Tl pp. 4 & 5) .

The court held these documents and the

orders just signed until October 15, 1982, stating that the
matter was under advisement and that a hearing may be set (Tl
6:4-6; R 110). These documents were all filed October 15, 1982.
On June 11, 1982, three days after the court's ruling
that Dixie was Hafen's alter ego and that the purported assets of
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Dixie were actually the assets of Hafen, Dixie's attorney Scott
A. Gubler filed his "Notice Of Attorney's Lien" (R 9 3 ) , claiming
a lien on the funds attached in Dixie's account at First Security
Bank and being held by the Clerk in an interest bearing account
as ordered by the court.

Various motions were thereafter made

and arguments presented regarding the alleged attorney's lien and
other matters not pertinent to this appeal.

The matter was taken

under advisement and continued until an October 15, 1982 hearing,
at which time the court ruled that the attorney's lien claimed by
Scott A. Gubler should be impressed on the attached funds (R
150-151; 177).
The court also ruled that a new Writ Of Attachment
should issue, and did issue such writ, which was served on the
Clerk of the court October 19, 1982 as the present custodian of
the funds and the hearing scheduled for October 25, 1982 (R
190-191), but continued by the court to October 27, 1982 (R
182-183).

A new undertaking was secured and filed (R 181).
Also on October 15, 1982, Transamerica moved to amend,

pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) U.R.C.P., the ruling impressing the
attorney's lien on the grounds that such a ruling was an error in
law and contrary to the court's prior ruling that Dixie was the
alter ego of Hafen and that Dixie's purported assets were in fact
the assets of Hafen (R 178-179).

Transamerica argued that this

prior ruling prevented the lien from attaching to funds not
belonging to Mr. Gublerfs client.

The court issued its "Order

For Stay" October 15, 1982, preventing the Clerk from releasing
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the funds to satisfy the claimed attorney's lien until further
order of the court (R 180).
At the October 27, 1982 hearing on the Writ Of
Attachment, the court heard the testimony of Transamericafs
treasurer regarding Hafen's account and heard the testimony of
John Hafen, son of Darrell G. Hafen, and took the matter under
advisement.
On January 13, 1983, Transamerica moved for summary
judgment on the pleadings, evidencef and testimony.

On January

27, 1983 Dixie moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim.
Hearing thereon was held February 8 f 1983 and the motions taken
under advisement.

The parties submitted various points and

authorities on the legal issues.

Eventually, on November 21,

1984, the court granted Transamerica1s motion for summary
judgment.

The "Order Granting Summary Judgment" was signed and

filed December 3, 1984.

The court requested Transamerica1s

attorney to prepare detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law (R 510) , and these were filed December 13, 1984.

Dixie filed

timely objections to these findings and conclusions by a document
titled "Defendant Dixie Power And Water Inc.'s Objections To
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law And Motion To Set Aside
Or Amend Order Granting Summary Judgment" (R 530-538) .
However, before the court could consider and rule on
these objectionsf Dixie filed its "Notice Of Appeal" on December
28, 1984 (R 539-540).

Hafen also filed a "Notice Of Appeal" (R

554), but to date has not taken any further steps to pursue his
appeal.

1 -3

Despite Transamerica1s efforts to get the court to rule
on the objections (R 571; 575-576), the court took no action on
this matter for several months.

The .court called the matter on

for review on April 17, 1985 (R 587), and continued the matter to
Friday morning, April 19, 1985, at 8:30 a.m., instructing the
attorneys to be present.

This was a very early setting inasmuch

as Judge Burns seldom opens court prior to 10:00 a.m.

As ordered

by the court, counsel for both parties appeared at the time and
place ordered, but Judge Burns failed to appear.

Finally, at the

risk of incurring the wrath of the court, Transamerica filed a
"Demand For Ruling" on July 3, 1985.

The matter came on for

hearing Monday, July 8, 1985. As shown by the minute entry for
said date, the court wanted to see counsel in chambers Thursday
or Friday, July 11 or 12, 1985. However, before that could be
done, the court prepared and executed its "Order Striking
Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law" the next day,
July 9, 1985. This document was filed with the clerk the next
day.

Apparently, this is the court's ruling on Dixie's

post-judgment motions.
Dixie has failed to file a notice of appeal within 30
days following the court's ruling on the post-judgment motions,
even though Transamerica's attorney has repeatedly advised
Dixie's attorney that a new notice of appeal is necessary under
the rules (See Demand For Ruling filed July 3, 1985; also see
R 575-576; R 570-574).

Dixie has filed its brief under the

belief that the December 28, 1984 "Notice Of Appeal" is still
valid and effective.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Transamerica seeks the dismissal of Dixie's
appeal for failure to file a timely notice of appeal after the
court ruled on Dixie's post-judgment motions.

The same applies

to the appeal of Hafen, as well as the fact that Hafen has not
taken any further steps to pursue his appeal, and as a
non-attorney officer of Defendant corporations, cannot pursue an
appeal for them.
The court's "Order And Judgment" (R 171-172) on the
alter ego issue was filed October 15, 1982. Being a final order
on that issue, and essentially merging the defendants Hafen and
Dixie, Dixie's attorney should have either taken an immediate
appeal of that judgment or filed a notice of intention to appeal
as provided by Rule 72(a), U.R.C.P., then in effect.

Effective

January 1, 1985, this rule has been replaced by Rules 3 and 4 of
the U.R.A.P., which are essentially the same. Having failed to
timely appeal or give notice of intent to appeal the alter ego
issue for over two years, Dixie is precluded from raising this
issue now.

Further, the facts supporting the court's ruling on

this issue was primarily contained in the testimony of John Hafen
on May 10, 1982, but Dixie has not provided a transcript of that
testimony as part of this appeal. Even though the record does
contain the deposition of John Hafen, without the testimony upon
which the ruling is primarily based, an appellate court cannot
adequately determine whether or not the court's ruling was
correct.
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Even if the reviewing court looks only at the record
before it, there is still ample evidence to support the court's
ruling that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen.

John Hafen was

the secretary of Dixie, yet he knew almost nothing about
corporate affairs. His lack of knowledge, manifested in his
deposition, is a typical portrayal of the knowledge that
officers, directors, and minor shareholders frequently have about
corporations in which their name is simply used to fill the
required offices.

The corporate veil is properly pierced

"backwards", such as when an individual incurs substantial
personal liability and keeps himself insolvent by holding his
major assets in corporations that he treats as his own
pocketbook.

In such a case, it is proper to pierce the corporate

veil and hold that the corporate assets are really the assets of
the individual, which was exactly what the lower court held (R
171-174).
The trial court issued a writ of attachment that was
later dissolved because it was not served as required by Rule
64A(7) U.R.C.P., but that rule only requires that the notice
gives "the adverse party actual notice of the proceeding. . .".
In this case, all defendants had actual notice of the hearing to
be held on the writ of attachment.

This is evident from the fact

that all defendants appeared by counsel in the matter prior to
the hearings held May 10, 1982 and June 8, 1982. Thus, the
original writ should not have been dissolved.

Further, as soon

as it was dissolved, Transamerica filed a written motion for a
new writ and then moved in open court (on July 14, 1982) for a
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new writ of attachment.

Thus, the second writ was secured with

notice to Dixie. This motion was taken under advisement by the
court until it was granted on October 15, 1982. Notice was
properly given and hearing thereon held.

There were no defects

in the second writ of attachment.
Mr. Gubler, Dixie1s attorney, claims an attorney's lien
on the funds held by the Clerk of the court.

This lien was filed

on June 11, 1982. The problem with this claim is that prior to
the filing of the attorney's lien, the court ruled on June 8,
1982 that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen and that the purported
assets of Dixie were in fact the assets of Hafen. Mr. Gubler
never represented Hafen in this matter, only the corporation.
Mr. Gubler cannot claim an attorney's lien on property that does
not belong to his client.

Further, there is no ". . . verdict,

report, decision or judgment in his client's favor" to which the
lien could attach.

Also, at the time of the claimed lien, Mr.

Gubler had not yet served ". . .an answer containing a
counterclaim" as required by the attorney's lien statute. In
fact, this was not done until November 22, 1982 (R 266-296).
Dixie has not raised any genuine issues of material
fact on this appeal to show why summary judgment was not
appropriate.

Hafen was convicted of 19 counts of mail fraud on

the same deposits and redemptions pertaining to this matter. The
standard of proof in the criminal matter (beyond a reasonable
doubt) is much higher than the standard in this civil action.

In

these circumstances, Section 76-3-201.2(2) of the Utah Code
operates to confirm the appropriateness of the summary judgment.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOP FAILURE TO
FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL FOLLOWING THE
COURT'S RULING ON DEFENDANT'S POST-JUDGMENT
MOTIONS.
Summary judgment for $93,426.59 was granted at a

hearing on November 21, 1984 (R 506) and the judgment was filed
December 3, 1984 (R 507-509).

The court requested Transamericafs

attorney to prepare detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law (R 510)f and these were filed December 13 f 1984.

Dixie filed

timely objections to these findings and conclusions by a document
titled "Defendant Dixie Power And Water Inc.'s Objections To
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law And Motion To Set Aside
Or Amend Order Granting Summary Judgment" (R 530-538).

Hafen

also filed a "Motion For Reconsideration" (R 544-546) requesting
that the judgment be vacated.
However, before the court could consider and rule on
these objections, Dixie filed its "Notice Of Appeal" on December
28, 1984 (R 539-540).

Hafen also filed a "Notice Of Appeal" (R

554) , but to date has not taken any further steps on his appeal.
On July 9, 1985 the court ruled on the post-judgment
motions when it signed an "Order Striking Proposed Findings Of
Fact And Conclusions Of Law".
July 10, 1985.

This order was filed the next dayf

Dixie's brief on this appeal was filed a few

weeks later, on or about July 19 f 1985.
by Hafen.

No brief has been filed

Dixie was aware of this order because a copy of it is

attached to Dixie's brief as Addendum A-6.
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The order strikes the proposed findings of fact to
which Dixie had objected and orders ". . .that said matter
proceed on Appeal without Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
supporting Summary Judgment,"

Dixie has failed to file a notice

of appeal within 30 days following this ruling on the
post-judgment motions, even though Transaraerica1s attorney has
repeatedly advised Dixie's attorney that a new notice of appeal
is necessary under the rules (See Demand For Ruling filed July 3,
1985; also see R 575-576; R 570-574).

Dixie apparently believes

that its December 28, 1984 "Notice Of Appeal" is still valid and
effective. Dixie is in error on this point and the appeal must
be dismissed.

This is true under the rules in effect on December

28, 1984 and also under the new Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(U.R.A.P.) that became effective January 1, 1985.
Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in
effect at the time notice of appeal was filed provides:
"The running of time for appeal is terminated by a
timely motion made pursuant to any of the rules
hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal
fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be
computed from the date of the entry in the Register of
Actions of any of the following orders made upon a
timely motion under such rules: . . . granting or
denying a motion under Rule 52(b) to amend gr makf*
additional findings of fact . . . granting or denying a
motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; •
Z 7™ (Emphasis Added.)

This court dismissed an appeal under identical circumstances in
D-M Investments v. Ray, Utah, 658 P.2d 1186, where the specific
«

issue presented was stated as follows:
The specific question presented is whether a notice of
appeal must be filed within one month after an amended
judgment has been entered where the time for appeal
from the original judgment has been extended under Rule
73(a) by the timely filing of a post-judgment motion."
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In that case, just as in this case; timely motions attacking the
findings and judgment were filed, but before the court ruled on
those motions, notices of appeal were filed.

A few months later,

a "minute entry" that disposed of the motions was entered.

In

this case, the court did more than just make a "minute entry" to
dispose of the motions.

The court prepared, executed, filed and

mailed to counsel a signed "Order Striking Proposed Findings Of
Fact And Conclusions Of Law", The Supreme Court gave no effect
to the premature filing of the notices of appeal in U-M
Investments v Ray, sayings
"Had no motions been filed under Rule 59 within 10 days
of the judgment, such notices of appeal clearly would
have been timely. However, under Rule 73(a) the timely
motions filed to upset the judgment rendered the
notices of appeal ineffective. The time for appeal
therefore automatically was rescheduled, and an appeal
then had to be taken within one month from the date of
the Register of Actions entry that denied defendants'
motions or amended the judgment."
Since no one filed a new notice of appeal within one month after
the "minute entry" was entered, the court dismissed the appeal.
The facts in the instant case are virtually identical, so the
same result should apply.
If the court's "Order Striking Proposed Findings Of
Fact And Conclusions Of Law" is interpreted not to be a ruling on
appellant's post-judgment motions, then the appeal still must be
dismissed because those motions remain undisposed of.

In such a

case, the Supreme Court may, on its own motion, determine lack of
jurisdiction, as it did in Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., (Utah,
1984) 694 P.2d 1043.

In Bailey, the supreme court said it will

not consider an appeal until the trial court has ruled on
post-judgment motions, and dismissed the appeal.
On January 1, 1985, just a few days after Dixie filed
its notice of appeal, the new Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(U.R.A.P.) took effect.

These new rules also require the

dismissal of this appeal.

Rule 4(a) U.R.A.P. requires a notice

of appeal to be filed with the clerk of the district court within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from.

But when post-judgment motions are filed, Rule 4(b)

U.R.A.P. extends the time and the 30 days does not start to run
until the entry of the order granting or denying the
post-judgment motion.

Said Rule 4(b) U.R.A.P. provides, in part,

as follows:
"If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the district court by any party:
(1) for a judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule
52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to
alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a
new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall
run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. . . .
A
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of
the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice
of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of the district
court disposing of the motion as provided above.w
Thus, dismissal of the appeal is the proper ruling under the new
rules when a premature notice of appeal is filed before the
ruling on the post-judgment motions, and no new notice of appeal
is filed after the ruling on the post-judgment motions.

See

footnote 1 in Bailey showing that the sanction for failure to
file a new notice of appeal under the new rules will be dismissal
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of the appeal.

In U-M Investments, supra, this court

distinguished Wood v. Turner,. 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634
(1966) , a case where a premature notice of appeal was allowed,
because no post-judgment motions were involved in Wood.

Again,

in C.M.C. Cassity, Inc. v. Aird, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 21,
(09/27/85), the Wood case and Nelson v. Stoker, Utah, 669 P.2d
390 (1983) were again distinguished on the basis that no
post-judgment motions had been filed in those cases.

In this

case, timely post-judgment motions were filed, and the appeal
must be dismissed.

II.

RULE 73(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(NOW RULES 3 AND 4 U.R.A.P.) PRECLUDE THE APPEAL
ON THE ALTER EGO ISSUE SINCE THAT "ORDER AND
JUDGMENT" WAS FILED OCTOBER 15, 1982 AND NO
APPEAL WAS TAKEN WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED.
The key issue on Dixie's appeal is this ruling that

Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen.

Unless Dixie can upset this

ruling, Dixie's argument and claim for an attorney's lien must
fail because an attorney's lien is good only against property of
the attorney's client (see Point V, infra), and if the alter ego
ruling stands, the rest of Dixie's arguments likewise fail
because it is Hafen, and not Dixie, that has standing to appeal
any other issues.
Transamerica contends that the appeal is not timely on
the alter ego issue, and that the appeal must therefore be
dismissed.

The "Order And Judgment" on the alter ego issue was

made June 8, 1982, signed July 14, 1982 and filed October 15,
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1982 (R 171-172).

The wording of the judgment stated:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, That the
purported corporate entity, Dixie Power and Water,
Inc. is the alter ego of Darrell Hafen and the assets
purportedly owned by said Dixie Power and Water, Inc.
are the assets of Defendant Darrell Hafen."
This was clearly a final judgment on the alter ego issue.
Dixie's remedy was either an immediate appeal on that issue or
the filing of a notice of intent to appeal as allowed by Rule
72(a), U.R.C.P., then in effect, which provides as follows:
" . . . when other claims remain to be determined in the
proceedings, a party may preserve his right to appeal
on the decided issue until a final determination of the
other claims by filing with the trial court and serving
on the adverse parties within the time permitted in
Rule 73(a), a notice of his intention to do so.ff
(Emphasis Added.)
Not only did Defendants fail to preserve this issue for appeal,
they also failed to file timely motions to amend this ruling,
although various untimely motions and memoranda were filed
discussing this point to encourage the court to reverse itself.
In fact, the actual findings and judgment on the alter
ego issue were prepared by Dixie's attorney because he did not
like the documents prepared by Transaraerica's attorney.

In

Dixie's "Objections To Plaintiff's Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law" on the alter ego issue, Dixie's attorney
states (R 165) that "Some of the Findings of Fact are not
supported by evidence introduced.

Therefore, Defendant has

attached their proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law."

The court signed the- documents prepared by Dixie's

attorney (R 171-174), which must indicate that Dixie was
satisfied with them.
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Even in the untimely motion (filed November 2, 1982,
more than 10 days after the findings and judgment were filed
October 15, 1982) to amend these findings (R 224-225), the only
objection to these documents was that they carried the frank of
Dixie's attorney.

At the November 9, 1982 hearing on these

objections, Transamerica did not object to the amendment of the
heading or frank of these documents, and the amendment was
allowed (R 237), as reported in T2 3:7-14, as follows:
"THE COURT: Now, next, you have a "Motion to Amend the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," that is
strictly to strike your frank from the pleading?
MR. GUBLER: That is correct.
THE COURT: You can either retype it without your name
on them or you can take a pencil and scratch it out.
MR. GUBLER: Thank you, your Honor."
Dixie's attorney apparently did not care to pursue it further, as
the documents were never retyped nor was his frank scratched out
on the documents. No other objection was ever filed to amend or
change the "Order And Judgment" that Dixie was the alter ego of
Hafen.

Therefore, objections going to that ruling, or which

collaterally attack that ruling, especially on appeal where no
notice of appeal of that issue was filed for more than two years
after its entry, should be disregarded as untimely and final.

III.

THE COURT'S RULING ON THE ALTER EGO ISSUE WAS
CORRECT.
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity

separate and apart from the individuals controlling it is a legal
theory introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve the
ends of justice.

If the concept is extended beyond its reason

and policy, or when invoked in support of an end subversive of
nA

this policy, it will be disregarded by the courts and the
corporation and the individuals controlling it will be treated as
identical.

See Stine v. Girola 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959),

46 ALR3d 428, and 18 Am.Jur.2d Corporations Section 14, page 559.
Dixie contends on this appeal that the alter ego
doctrine cannot be used to pierce the corporate veil unless the
corporation has committed some kind of fraud, acting through an
agent, such as a major shareholder, a director, or an officer.
Dixie correctly states that disregard of the corporate entity is
most commonly applied where an individual creates a corporation
and then does acts (i.e., commits a fraud) within the corporation
giving a third party a cause of action, and then unlawfully uses
the corporation to shield him from personal liability.

But Dixie

is wrong when it argues that the alter ego doctrine cannot be
used when an individual incurs personal liability but seeks to
avoid payment of that liability by holding all his assets in a
corporation, at least where the individual totally disregards
corporate formalities and the corporation is nothing more than
the individual's "incorporated pocketbook".
Dixie asks this court to reconsider the lower court's
ruling of June 8, 1982 that Dixie is the alter ego of Hafen and
that its assets are, in fact, the assets of Darrell Hafen (and
hence, were subject to the prejudgment attachment for his debts),
but Dixie has not obtained a transcript of the May 10, 1982
hearing upon which the lower court's ruling was based.

Without

that transcript, this court cannot adequate review that decision,
even though this court does have the "Deposition of John Hafen"
(Exhibit P-20), the alleged secretary of Dixie.
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But even if this court looks only to the record before
itf there is ample reason to uphold the ruling.

First, Darrell

G. Hafen was the President of Dixie,-but refused to submit to a
deposition (R 69-71) . Upon being ordered to submit to a
deposition, he resigned as President of Dixie by a telephone call
to Dixie's attorney (R 81-82).

Yet, a month later, without any

further corporation action or meetings, he files an answer with
the court (R 99-103) in which he states he is the President of
Dixie.

Mr. Darrell G. Hafen is playing games with the court. He

is President when he wants to be, but isn't when it is
uncomfortable or inconvenient.
Second, just with the deposition of John Hafen, the son
of Darrell G. Hafen, and the alleged "secretary" of Dixie, we
have more than ample reason to disregard the corporation.

John

Hafen stated in his deposition that he did not know if there was
a vice president (D 4:13-14); that he was not aware that as
secretary he was supposed to keep the corporate records (D
4:15-18); that he did not keep the records and did not know who
did (D 4:19-23); that he did not know if there was a treasurer (D
4:26-29); that he was "appointed" secretary by Darrell Hafen (D
5:1-3); that he did not know the date of this alleged
"appointment" (D 5:4-9) but that he did not get "appointed" at a
stockholders' meeting (D 5:10-15); that there had been two
meetings of stockholders, but these alleged meetings were on
Christmas day and there are no minutes of them, or of any
stockholders' meetings for that matter (D 5:16-28); that he did
not know the last time that a directors1 meeting had been held (D
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5:29-31 & 6:1-8); that he knew of no directors1 meetings that had
ever been held (D 6:9-11); that he knew of no other meetings of
stockholders or directors that Darrell Hafen had ever held (D
6:12-30); that he did not even know what the word "directors'*
meant in the context of a corporation (D 9:9-15); that all the
corporate stock was given to the shareholders—no one paid
anything for their stock (D 11:29 to 13:15); that he had never
sent a notice of stockholders' meeting to any of the stockholders
(D 13:16-19); that no notice was sent to stockholders regarding
the two alleged "stockholders' meetings" held on Christmas day (D
13:20 to 14:3); that he did not even know who the "directors" of
Dixie were (D 14:8-15); that he had never prepared minutes of any
meetings (D 14:15-16); that there was no corporate authorization
to open Dixie's bank accounts at either Sun Captial Bank or First
Security Bank (D 14:17 to 16:7); that he did not know how many
signatures were required to withdraw funds from Dixie's account
(D 16:8-10); that it was his father's idea to open the account (D
16:14-15); that Dixie hired an attorney (Mr. Gubler) to represent
the corporationf but that there was no directors' meeting or
other corporate authorization to do so, but that Darrell Hafen
took it upon himself to hire counsel (D 17:15-30); that he didn't
like the attitude of a bank officer at Sun Capital Bank and took
it upon himself to transfer the funds to a new account at First
Security Bank, without any corporate authorization (D 21:1-15);
that no tax returns have ever been filed by Dixie (D 29:21 to
30:9); that he withdrew funds from Dixie's account to pay bills,
such as the lease payments of the Ford Fiesta automobile that
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Darrell G. Hafen drives (D 31:5 to 32:7), to pay "loans" to
family members (D 32:8-17) , and to pay the personal traffic
tickets of Darrell G. Hafen (D 3 2 : 1 9 T 2 0 ) ; that there were no
notes or other documents to evidence the alleged corporate
"loans" (D 32:23-30); and finally, that there was no interest due
on the alleged loans (D 33:1),
In 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations Section 52f page 857,
there is a checklist of 17 facts and circumstances tending to
show when a corporate president is the alter ego of the
corporation.

The above references to John Hafenfs deposition

includes 13 of the 17 factors on that checklist.

Under these

circumstances, this case meets the test of this checklist and
also the test of Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Company
(Utah, 1979) 596 P.2d 1028 that (1) there must be such unity of
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individuals no longer exist, so that the
corporation is in fact the alter ego of one or a few individuals;
and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a
fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow.
There can be no doubt that Dixie is simply the alter ego of
Hafen.
Even in the pleadings, Dixie and Hafen have virtually
admitted that Dixie is nothing more than the pocketbook of Hafen.
In seeking a continuance for the trial, Dixie filed the affidavit
of its attorney (R 368-369) , Scott Gubler, stating that Hafen was
being held in custody on a federal conviction in Massachusetts,
and that Hafen had told him that he could not afford to travel to
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Utah for the trial "because of lack of funds in that Plaintiff
(Transamerica) has attached all traveling funds which would have
been available to Darrell G. Hafen for traveling purposes."

If

the funds were not Hafen's funds they would not have been
available to him in any event. That statement appears to be what
one might call, perhaps, a "freudian slip"—an admission that the
court's ruling was indeed correct.
Dixie concedes that under certain circumstances a
creditor can pierce the corporate veil and hold an individual
liable for the debts of the corporation. Dixie, however, argues
that the reverse is not permissable, i.e., that one cannot apply
the alter ego theory to hold the corporation liable for the debts
of the individual, or, as some have termed it, to pierce the
corporate veil "backwards".
While this situation is not nearly so common, it
nevertheless is a proper application of the alter ego doctrine.
Initially, it might be said that common sense would tell us that
if an individual can be held for the debts of a corporation, a
corporation (in proper circumstances) can be held for the debts
of an individual. More persuasively, perhaps, the cases also say
t*he same thing.
In Dockstader v. Walker 29 tJtah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526,
at page 528, the proper use of the "alter ego" doctrine is
explained as follows:
"The term "alter ego" is used to describe a situation
where the courts go behind the corporate entity and
hold a stockholder liable for the debts of the
corporation or to hold that it is the stockholder apd
not the corporation which owns the assets.
The doctrine is generally applied to situations known
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as fone-man corporations1, i.e., where one man owns
practically all of the stock, either directly or
through others who hold it for hisiuse and benefit, and
where the stockholder uses the corporation as a shield
to protect him from debts-or wrongdoings." (Emphasis
Supplied).
Thus, the Utah has recognized that the corporate entity
can be pierced "backwards".

In the instant case, Hafen has used

Dixie to hold his assets to protect them from his personal "debts
and wrongdoings".

The doctrine of piercing of the corporate veil

can be applied "backwards" to place liability on the corporate
entity for debts owed by one who controls and dominates the
corporation.

See Reynolds Pallet & Box Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 F.2d

833 (6th Cir. 1963); Goldberg v. Engelberg, 34 Cal. App. 2d 10,
92 P.2d 935 (1939) .
Typical of such cases, is the case of Grotheer v. Meyer
Rosenberg, Inc., (Calif., 1936) 53 P.2d 996.

It is a 1936 case

that has been cited several times for the proposition of piercing
the corporate veil "backwards".

It is discussed here because it

is almost on "all fours" with the instant case.

In that case,

plaintiffs sought to hold the defendant, Meyer Rosenberg, Inc.
liable for the payment of a money judgment previously obtained by
plaintiffs against Meyer Rosenberg, individually, upon the ground
said corporation was the alter ego of Meyer Rosenberg, the
individual.

Plaintiffs obtained a writ of attachment at the

commencement of the action and caused it to be levied on the
corporate bank account, just as was done in the instant case.
The corporation moved to dissolve the attachment and it was
dissolved.

Plaintiffs appealed, and the court reversed,

reinstating the writ of attachment.

The appellate court noted

that it was alleged that Meyer Rosenberg had transferred all his
property to the corporation to place that property beyond
plaintiffs' reach, so that plaintiffs' claim, or judgment, could
not be satisfied.

On page 998, the court said:

"If the foregoing allegations are true, then Meyer
Rosenberg, Inc., is doubtless liable for the debts of
Meyer Rosenberg individually, for it is well settled
that inasmuch as the separate personality or capacity
of a corporation is but a statutory privilege, it must
not be utilized for fraudulent purposes, such as a
cloak or disguise for the_evasion of contracts or other
obligations; . . • The separateness of the person and
the corporation would of course be recognized if no
inequitable results would follow. But, where, as here^
an^ inequitable result would follow, the two should be
considered as one, I I T* x(Emphasis Added).
This case not only held that the alter ego doctrine can
be applied "backwards", but that attachment of the allegedly
corporate assets was appropriate.
In Wilson v. Stearns, (Calif., 1954) 267 P.2d 59,
Wilson, a real estate broker, had an agreement with Stearns, a
subdivider and builder of homes on tract properties, to sell
Steam's property.

Later, Stearns transferred the land to a

corporation, Alamo Development Company, which developed the
property.

Wilson assisted in the sales, but was not paid.

The issue pertinent here, that was raised there, was whether
Alamo Development Company, which had signed no agreement with
Wilson, could be held liable for Stern's personal debts.
The court, after reviewing the facts which justified a
finding that Stearns and Alamo were one and the same—that Alamo
was the alter ego of Stearns—held at page 68:
"The foregoing recital of evidence convinces us that
there were here present all the necessary elements to
constitute an alter ego relationship between George
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Stearns and Alamo Development Company, the corporation,
namely, (1) control of the corporation by Stearns; (2)
that the corporation was but the mere conduit of the f
business of Stearns; (3) that recognition of the
separate existence of the corporation would sanction a
fraud and permit oppression and injustice."
The court held that the two should be considered as one
and allowed Wilson to recover from Alamo, the corporation, for
the debt of Stearns, the individual.

Regarding the standard of

review and the alter ego doctrine, the court said:
The trial court was the judge of the value and effect
of evidence challenging the verity of the testimony
here narrated. The separate personality or capacity of
a corporation being but a statutory privilege, it must
not be utilized for fraudulent purposes, such as a
cloak or disguise for the evasion of contracts or other
obligations. The evidence here strongly points to the
conclusion that the corporation was distinctly a
one-man corporation. Where it appears that a
corporation is being used merely as an instrumentality
through which an individual who is the owner of its
capital stock transacts his business, and where an
inequitable result would ensue, the two should be
considered as one."
The court also pointed out, at page 69, that:
"It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove actual
fraud. It is enough if the recognition of the two
entities as separate would result in an injustice."
(Emphasis Added).
In the instant case, whether there is a showing of
fraud or not is unimportant, just that an injustice would occur,
i.e., that Hafen could steal large sums of money from
Transaraerica, as he has been convicted of doing, but could defeat
efforts to recover some or all of the money by putting his own
assets in a corporation which the court has already determined is
nothing but his alter ego.

It should not matter, as far as

justice and equity are concerned, whether it is the same money,

or whether it is other funds legitimately belonging to Hafen that
are attached.
State ex. rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co. (Wyo.
1944) 144 P.2d 944, dealt with an attempt by the organizers of a
corporation to avoid a workman's compensation obligation of their
predecessor partnership.

On pages 949-50, the court, quoting

from an earlier case, adopted as its own, the following:
" 'It is now so well established that it has become
almost aphoristic that upon a proper showing that a
corporation is but an instrumentality through which its
owner or substantial owners for convenience transacts
or transact his or their business, by the great weight
of authority, both equity and law will look through the
form to its substance and will hold such corporation
bound as the owner of the corporation might be bound or
conversely hold the owner bound by acts which bind his
corporation. And so, where an individual owns all of
the stock of a corporation or substantially so, and
that the corporation is in truth and in fact, but the
juristic double of its owner and where fraud or
injustice will likely operate to the injury of third
persons, this situation suffices to dissipate the
separate fictional identity of the corporation and the
law will have no compunction in holding the corporation
liable for the acts of its owners or vice versa. And
this rule is the same though the stock of the
corporation is owned by two or more who act in
conjunction with the corporate organization. (Citations
omitted.) Actual intent to defraud is not necessary.
It is sufficient if the refusal to recognize the fact
of the identity of the corporate existence with that of
the individual would bring about an inequitable result.
(Emphasis Added).
Finally, after holding the corporation liable for the
debt of the individual partnership, the court in Christensen made
the following observations at page 952:
"It has been held that 'the conditions under which the
corporate entity may be disregarded, or the corporation
be regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders,
necessarily vary according to the circumstances in each
case inasmuch as the doctrine is essentially an
equitable one and for that reason is particularly
within the province of the trial court."
33

Plaintiffs submit that the ruling-of the district court
in the instant case was proper and that the alter ego principal,
of piercing the corporate veil "backwards" to hold the
corporation liable for the individual debts of the person
controlling and dominating the corporationf in the appropriate
circumstances shown here, is just as appropriate as the common
practice of piercing the corporate veil to hold an individual
liable for a corporate debt in the proper circumstances.

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISSOLVING THE FIRST
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BECAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE WAS
NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MADE A GENERAL
APPEARANCE BY COUNSEL. IN ANY EVENT, THE SECOND
WRIT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED, SERVED, MAINTAINED.
The district court dissolved the first writ of

attachment on the grounds (R 167-168) "That notice was not
properly served as required by Rule 64A(7) upon defendant
corporation, Dixie Power and Water, Inc."

Said rule provides as

follows:
"(7) Any notice required under this Rule shall be in
such form and served in such manner as will
expeditiously give the adverse party actual notice of
the proceeding, all as directed by the court."
Only actual notice is required, personal service on the
registered agent, president, or secretary of Dixie, is not the
only way to give actual notice.

As long as Dixie had actual

notice of the attachment, and of the hearing to be held thereon,
so that it could appear and defend, is all that is necessary.
The record shows that not only Dixie, but all defendants, had
actual notice of the attachment and of the hearing because all
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the defendants made appearances in the matter.

The record shows

that Hafen contacted the court and Transamerica's attorney and
requested a continuance of the hearing (R 37-38), which was
granted.

Although this contact was by telephone, and not in

person, it shows that Hafen had actual notice of the attachment
and of the hearing to be held thereon.

Next, all defendants

sought and were granted another continuance, this time through an
attorney, Fay E. Reber (R 50-51).

John Hafen, the alleged

secretary of Dixie, was personally served with a subpoena to
appear at the next hearing (R 65-66) scheduled for April 13,
1982.

At that hearing Dixie appeared by attorney Scott A.

Gubler.

The matter was continued to May 10, 1982 when the

hearing was held (R 69), and the matter continued to June 8,
1982, when the district court ruled that the writ should be
dissolved.
A voluntary appearance by a party is sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction over him.
it is still valid.

This was the ancient law, and

(Adam v. Saenger 303 U.S. 59, 58 S.Ct. 454,

82 L.Ed. 649, 1938).

The record shows that the money on deposit

at First Security Bank was attached and later deposited with the
Olerk of the court, who has placed the funds in an interest
bearing account.

The bank was properly served and the return of

service is in the court file (R 32-35) .

There can be no doubt

that the court has jurisdiction of the property, in this case,
money.

Kramer v. Fixton 72 Utah 1, 268 P. 1029 states the

well-known rule regarding personal jurisdiction on page 1031:
"Personal service of summons, or a general appearance
in an action by attorney or otherwise, is universally
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held to give a court jurisdiction of the person of a
defendant."
The law in Utah is that an appearance solely to seek a
continuance is a general appearance subjecting that party to the
in personam jurisdiction of the court.

This long-established

rule was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in Cooke v. Cook**
(Utahf 1926) 248 P. 83, where the court stated, on page 106:
"An application for an extension of time to plead is a
recognition of the jurisdiction of the court over the
person and constitutes a general appearance."
The court went on to say that this general appearance cannot be
limited in effect or scope by any statement on the part of
counsel.
Accordingly, the district court erred when it dissolved
the first writ of attachment because the defendants all had
actual notice of the writ and of the hearings.

By dissolving the

writ, the district court possibly subjected Transamerica to a
claim for damages.
As soon as the court dissolved the first writ,
Transamerica immediately move for a new writ of attachment
(R152-154), which the court held under advisement until it
finally granted a new writ on October 15, 1982. The request for
a new writ of attachment was made in open court on July 14, 1982
(Tl pp. 4 & 5), so it was not issued without notice. A new
undertaking was obtained (R 181), the writ was served (R
197-199) , and notices of the hearing on the writ were given to
all parties (192-196), the hearing was held (R 216-217) and the
writ continued in effect until summary judgment was granted.
There have been no defects in the second writ, and, of course, by
-*G

the time this second writ issued, the court had already ruled (R
171) that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen, so Dixie cannot be
heard to complain that its funds were unlawfully attached, as the
funds actually belonged to Hafen.
Defendants were all personally served on June 10, 1982
(R 96-98) , filed their answer (R 99-103) and an "Ex Parte Motion
For Stay" (R 104) on June 27, 1982, so no complaint can be made
about the hearing after that date.
Both writs were issued based upon the verified
complaint (R 1-27) , which more than adequately alleges that Dixie
was the mere alter ego of Hafen and clearly sets forth the
specific facts showing that immediate injury, loss, or damage
would result.

Had Transamerica proceeded by complaint and

motion, Hafen would have moved the funds at his bank in the blink
of an eye.

After having taken Transamerica to the tune of

$394,380.75, Transamerica had to act quickly and without notice
to attach funds whereever it could find them.

The remedy of a

prejudgment writ of attachment was designed and intended for
situations like the one presented here.

There was no error in

issuing the writs of attachment.

V.

AN ATTORNEY'S LIEN CANNOT BE IMPRESSED ON FUNDS
THAT DO NOT BELONG TO THE ATTORNEY'S CLIENT.
On June 8, 1982 the district court ruled that Dixie

Power And Water, Inc. was the alter ego of Defendant Darrell G.
Hafen and that the assets of Dixie were, in fact, the assets of
Hafen.

This ruling was subsequently reduced to an "Order And

Judgment" dated July 14, 1982 (R. 171).
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It was not until after this rulina that Scott A.
Gubler, Dixie's attorney, first filed a claim seeking an
attorney's lien on the attached funds.. The ruling was made June
8, 1982 and the alleged attorney's lien was first claimed three
days later on June llf 1982 (R 93).

Mr, Gubler has never, at any

time in this case, represented the owner of the attached funds,
to-wit, Defendant Darrell G. Hafen.

He has only represented the

alter ego, the corporate shell called Dixie Power And Water, Inc,
Further, as of June 11, 1982 when the lien was claimed, Mr.
Gubler had not filed an answer containing a counterclaim nor had
there been a verdict, report, decision or judgment in Dixie's
favor.

Under these circumstances, the Utah attorney's lien

statute does not allow an attorney's lien.
Section 78-51-41, UCA, 1953, as amended, provides in
part that:
"From the commencement of an action or the service of
an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict,
report, decision, or judgment in his client's favor .
. . w (Emphasis Added)«
The statute lays down two requirements, neither of
which are met in this case. First, an attorney's lien attaches,
in the case of defendant's attorney, only after the service of an
answer containing a counterclaim.

Mr. Gubler did not file a

counterclaim until December 12, 1982 and then only to correct
this defect.

Until then, his efforts had been limited to

attempts to secure the release of the funds attached.

However,

this was some six months after this Court ruled the assets did
not belong to his client.

Second, there must be a decision or
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judgment in his client's favor.

His client is Dixie Power And

Water, Inc. and no decision or judgment in favor of Dixie has
ever been made.

The ruling that the assets of Dixie were, in

fact, the assets of Hafen and a decision against Mr. Gubler's
client.

This was a finding that Darrell G. Hafen owned the

assets (bank account) which was attached.

Dixie has been found

by the district court not to own the attached funds.

Mr.

Gubler's attorney's lien cannot be asserted against funds not
owned by his client.
In Lundeberg v. Dastrup v. Husbands 2S Utah 2d 28, 497
P.2d 648, after citing the attorney's lien statute, the court
said:
"The lien which this statute gives the attorney is upon
his client's cause of action and/or the judgment; and
with respect thereto he stands in no better position
than his client. For the same reasons stated above,
indicating that the plaintiffs' judgment does not run
against either Alyce Husbands or Mick Caravelli, any
lien the plaintiffs attorney may have thereon is
likewise not effective against them."
Dixie has no final judgment in its favor in this matter
as it pertains to the attached funds.

Mr. Gubler's lien cannot

attach to assets not owned by his client.

In 7 Am.Jur. 2d

Attorneys At Law Section 315, page 332, it states, in reference
to attorney's liens, that "Its existence depends on possession by
the attorney of money or property of his client.", and cites
Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders 21 Utah 2d 181, 442 P.2d 938, a
case in which the Utah Supreme Court said:
"It is to be noted that the statute above set out gives
to an attorney what is called a charging lien which
attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in
his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof, etc.
(emphasis original). At the time of the order
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purportedly giving liens to the attorney, the plaintiff
had no verdict, report, decision,«nor judgment in his
favor, and, of course, he had no proceeds therefrom.
The statute gives a lien to the attorney on the fruits
of his labor so as to protect him against an unjust
enrichment on the part of a nonpaying client."
As this case illustrates, there can be no attorney's
lien because (1) there are no assets of Dixie Power And Water,
Inc. to which it could attach; and (2) there is no decision or
judgment in favor of Mr. Gubler's client.
An additional point precluding this attorney's lien is
the absence of a cause of action to which it may attach.

In 7

Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys At Law, Section 339, pages 347-48 it
states, again citing Midvale Motors, supra, that:
"It is said that an attorney's charging lien attaches
to the fruits of his skill and labor. If the
attorney's work is sterile and produces no fruit, then
he has no lien. . . . The statute may provide that
the lien shall attach from the date of filing suit, the
time of commencement of the action, or the time of
service of summons. In the case of the attorney for
the defense, it may provide that his lien attaches on
service of an answer containing a counterclaim."
The Utah statute, quoted above, provides that the lien
of an attorney for a defendant attaches only on ". . .the service
of an answer containing a counterclaim."

Mr. Gubler had not

filed an answer containing a counterclaim, or even an answer, on
behalf of his client before the pivotal decision of June 8, 1982
as to who owned the attached funds, and does not fit the
statutory definition of attorneys entitled to the lien.
A fourth, and final, reason to deny the lien is that
Utah law requires the attorney to bring a separate action against
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his client to determine the amount of the lien.

In 7 Am. Jur. 2d

Attorneys At Lawf Section 345, page 351, it states:
"It has been held that an attorney1s lien on property
recovered mayf on application to the court, be enforced
in the original action in which the services were
rendered. . . .
On the other hand, the rule of some
courts is that, in the absence of special circumstances
requiring a contrary holding to prevent injustice,
counsel must bring a separate action against his client
to determine the amount of his fee and to foreclose his
charging lien if he has any."
Utah law follows the latter rule, requiring a separate
action to be brought.

As stated in Midvale Motors, supra, at

page 941:
"While there is authority to the effect that an
attorney's lien on property recovered in an action may
on application to the court be enforced in the original
matter (see 7 Am.Jur. 2d, Attorneys At Law, § 302), we
think the better rule, in the absence of special
circumstances requiring a contrary holding to prevent
injustice, is to require counsel to bring a separate
action against his client to determine the amount of
his fee and to foreclose his charging lien if any he
has."
Mr. Gubler's alleged lien is improper under the Utah
statute because (1) the assets he is attempting to lien do not
belong to his client; (2) there has been no decision or judgment
in favor of his client; (3) no answer containing a counterclaim
was filed by Mr. Gubler before this Court determined the assets
belonged to Darrell G. Hafen; and (4) no separate action has been
brought to determine his lien, if any.

VI.

THE COURT PPOPEPLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND
SECTION 76-3-201.2 OF THE UTAH CODE OPERATES
TO CONCLUSIVELY DETERMINE LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.
Dixie argues that there was no basis to grant summary

judgment because there were material issues of fact, but Dixie's
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brief fails to set forth any facts that Dixie contends were
material and were in dispute. The only specific item mentioned
in Dixie's brief is the allegation that there was no proof that
would permit the court to find fraud by Dixie in its
orgainization or operations. As has been discussed in Point III,
supra, in order to apply the alter ego doctrine, it is not
necessary for a court to find fraud in the organization or
operation of a corporation—it is sufficient if the court finds
there is a unity of interest or ownership or that one person
dominates or controls the corporation and that observance of the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
allow an inequitable result. Any of the three is sufficient, but
in the instant case, all three are present.
As to any doubt about the liability of defendant
Darrell G. Hafen in this matter, he was convicted in the United
States District Court, District of Massachusetts, in Criminal No.
82 00053, of 19 counts of mail fraud on the same deposits and
redemptions pertaining to this matter.

Certified copies of his

conviction are part of the record on this appeal (R 476-503).
The standard of proof in the criminal matter (beyond a reasonable
doubt) is much higher than the standard in this civil action.
The court found that Hafen has admitted his signatures on the
checks in this matter (R 346-347) by failing to establish a
defense as required by Section 70A-3-307(2) of the Utah Code.
Liability was properly established.
Plaintiff1s Exhibits 1, 3, and 4 establish the amount
of damages. No dispute has ever been made as to the amount
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established by these exhibits.
Further, Section 76-3-201.2(2) of the Utah Code,
provides:
"If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides
the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary
damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a
subsequent civil action/ (Emphasis Added).
Hafen's liability is therefore conclusively determined.

There

was no error in granting the summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
The summary judgment order of the district court should
be affirmed.

Also, the Supreme Court should rule that the

district court erred when it dissolved the first writ of
attachment, because the defendants had actual notice of the writ
and the hearing thereon.

This ruling should be made to preclude

the subsequent filing of a lawsuit for damages by defendants.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of January, 1986.

L. MILES
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the

?^day of January,

1986, I caused four (4) true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF
RESPONDENTS to be hand-delivered to the law offices of Scott A.
Gubler, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant Dixie Power And Water,
Inc., at 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah, and that on the

43

3o*

day of January, 1986, I caused four (4) true and correct

cdpies of the BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to be mailed, first class
postage prepaid by United States mail, to Defendants-Appellants
Darrell G. Hafen and Transworld Securites, S.A., addressed to FCI
Box H 75451, Safford, Arizona 85546.

0CHN L. MILES
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
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